On February 28th, Donald Trump announced that the United States would once again go to war in the Middle East, this time against Iran. Administration officials and sympathetic commentators have framed the conflict as limited and short-lived, offering familiar assurances of “weeks, not months.” Yet early signals suggest otherwise. A month into the conflict, Trump himself suggested the United States might be out of Iran “within two weeks, maybe two weeks, maybe three.” While one can hope this proves true, there is little reason for confidence, especially as the Pentagon requests another two hundred billion to continue fighting.
This war is bad for America. It rests on weak justifications, pursues unclear and unachievable objectives, imposes serious costs, and creates a strategic trap in which anything short of decisive victory leaves the United States worse off than before.
The Unconvincing Case for War
War imposes enormous human and economic costs. It therefore requires a correspondingly strong justification. As of early April this war had killed over thirty-five hundred people, almost half of them civilians. Thirteen Americans and hundreds of children are dead. An AEI report estimates this war costs the average US household $410 dollars a month. Such costs might be defensible if the case for war was compelling. Tragically, it is not.
Apologists present five justifications for the war: 1) Iran is an anti-American regime, 2) Iran poses a nuclear threat, 3) Iran sponsors terrorism against our allies, 4) we are effectively already at war, and 5) Iran oppresses its own people. Each of these concerns contain some truth. None, however, are good enough reasons to go to war.
First, certain commentators cite Iran’s ideological opposition to America as a reason to attack them. But hostility toward the United States is not unique to Iran, nor is it sufficient grounds for war. Although Iranian leaders have long employed anti-American rhetoric, such animus exists in many parts of the world, often as a consequence of past U.S. actions in the region. More importantly, war is unlikely to reduce this hostility and may actually deepen it. Military conflict inevitably produces civilian casualties and destruction. We already destroyed a school and killed over one hundred fifty children. Place yourself in an average Iranian person’s shoes. Would that attack make you more or less likely to hate America? “They hate us” is no reason to go to war, especially if it will give them more reason to hate us.
Second, the nuclear argument is presented as an urgent justification. The concern is that Iran may eventually acquire nuclear weapons and pose a direct threat to the United States or its allies. But there is little to no evidence that Iran intended to use or even obtain a nuclear weapon. Benjamin Netanyahu had been warning of a nuclear Iran since 1992. Over three decades later, Iran has not built one even though it appears that they could. According to a senior US official, “if Iran wanted one, they have all the things they need.” So why haven’t they? Well, mere days before Trump began the war, the Iranian President said the Ayatollah and their religion forbade them from building a nuclear weapon.
Even granting that Iran wants to pursue such a weapon, it does not follow that war is the appropriate response. Military action can at best delay a nuclear program; it cannot eliminate the underlying knowledge or long-term capability required to build one. It does follow, however, that attempting to overthrow this regime may incentivize other dictatorial, anti-American regimes to build the bomb to protect themselves. This policy, intended to prevent nuclearization, may actually accelerate it.
Furthermore, we proved in the twelve-day war that our bunker buster bombs can destroy their nuclear facilities. Were they to race toward a nuclear weapon in the future we would be able to destroy it again. The nuclear threat is overstated and if it ever did manifest, we could neutralize it without going to war.
Third, while Iran’s support for proxy groups in the region is a legitimate concern, it does not necessarily justify direct American intervention. The United States has an interest in the security of its allies, but that interest does not require us to go to war. Regional partners possess significant military capabilities of their own, and in many cases, they have actively countered Iranian-backed groups. If further action were deemed necessary, the United States could provide support to them without committing itself to a direct and open-ended conflict. Alliance commitments do not automatically entail offensive war.
Fourth, the idea that we are already at war with Iran is unpersuasive. It was the primary thrust of Trump’s justification. He cited six actions to prove they are fighting us already: 1) the hostage crisis in 1979, 2) the bombing of marines in Beirut in 1983, 3) the attack on the USS Cole in 2000 which Iran was “probably” involved with, 4) Iran’s involvement in the Iraq war, and 5) “countless attacks against American forces stationed in the Middle East in recent years”. The first two attacks were over forty years ago, taking place before Iran became our partner in the Iran-Contra affair, wherein we smuggled arms to Iran. It’s unconvincing to imply we were at war with them while actively arming them. The third attack is debatable as to how involved Iran even was, hence Trump’s use of the word “probably.” That’s hardly a good justification for war. Fourth, Iran attacked our troops in Iraq. At best, that would have put them at war with us during the Iraq war, which ended over a decade ago. Lastly, there are miscellaneous attacks against US bases in the area from Iranian adjacent groups. The idea that these amount to a war is just false. They are best handled with targeted strikes against select leaders, like the killing of Soleimani in 2020.
Finally, some defenders of this war argue that we are there to liberate the people of Iran. The regime killed thirty thousand protestors in January. But humanitarian concerns, while morally compelling, do not by themselves provide a workable basis for war. North Korea oppresses its people, Syria oppresses its people (under both the old Assad regime and the new ISIS-affiliated Ahmed al-Sharaa regime), and even some allies have been accused of oppressing their people. We do not, however, see this as a reason to topple these regimes, because a) we don’t want to spend hundreds of billions and lose dozens of American lives and b) it’s not obvious that doing so would improve the lives of the civilians.
This purported justification also overlooks the fact that the evidence undermines the notion that this war’s purpose is to liberate the people. Trump and Pete Hegseth, the Secretary of War, have both said they will send Iran “back to the stone age.” They have bombed civilian infrastructure. In response to US aggression, there have been nearly a thousand protests and demonstrations in favor of the Iranian regime. And there are a few if any examples of US interventions in the region improving civilian lives. Fifteen hundred civilians are already dead. Tens of thousands of people are injured. These are not the actions of a benevolent force that has come to liberate an oppressed people.
War is hell. It destroys nations and ends lives. It should be avoided at nearly all costs. Each of the commonly offered fails to establish that war is either necessary or prudent. A more restrained approach, such as supporting allies through limited and targeted actions, would better align with American interests. I supported the killing of Soleimani and even the twelve-day war. But an engagement of this magnitude is indefensible.
The Objectives of War Are Unclear and Unachievable
Even assuming that the above concerns were compelling, no one has clearly defined what this war is supposed to achieve. The administration appears to be pursuing four objectives simultaneously: 1) transforming or replacing the Iranian regime, 2) permanently eliminating Iran’s nuclear capability, 3) securing the region, and 4) reducing Iranian attacks. Taken individually, each of these goals would be difficult. Taken together, they are internally contradictory and likely unachievable.
The primary goal seems to be the replacement or transformation of the regime. Transforming the regime, however, is infeasible. After killing the previous Ayatollah, the new leader allegedly wants revenge for “the blood of our martyrs” and “the blood of our children. It appears this war has radicalized the remaining members of the Iranian government to be more militant and anti-American than they were before.
We might be able to continue killing officials (and killing roughly as many civilians as a byproduct) from the air in hopes of toppling the regime. But whatever civil war that creates is likely to generate a refugee crisis that further destabilizes the region. And there is no guarantee that whatever faction comes out ahead will not be more anti-American than the previous regime.
This all suggests that we will need boots-on-the-ground land invasion if we wish to achieve a satisfactory regime change. Yet no one wants a years-long quagmire in Iran, which would be unpopular politically and end the Republican Party’s electoral chances in 2026 and potentially 2028.
Our second objective seems similarly confused. Whether or not we leave the current regime intact and/or create a power vacuum, the remaining Iranian rulers are likely to be more radical than Ayatollah Khomeini. We may set them back a few months or years but the knowledge of how to build the bomb will remain. The attack will only increase the likelihood that the Iranian leadership wants an atomic bomb.
To avoid this disastrous outcome that leaves us worse off than we started, we would need to replace the regime with leadership friendly to America. But as already discussed, that is unlikely without a drawn-out occupation. Similar military actions in the region have, of course, historically gone poorly for both the US and the local people. And the chances of a domestic uprising to replace the regime, which appeared unlikely to begin with, are now even worse as previously discussed because of this US intervention.
Meanwhile, efforts to “secure the region” have coincided with increased instability, including attacks on U.S. partners and disruptions to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Experts warned that even a military effort may not reliably secure it, and that Iran could attempt to extract ongoing leverage from the disruption. The war may very well make them even more dominant in the region. Even should we manage to keep the Strait open, that cannot be considered a success given Hormuz was open in February.
Lastly, we want to protect America and its allies from Iranian attacks. At least in the short term this objective is an obvious failure. Thirteen Americans and at least fifty American allies across Israel, UAE, etc. have been killed so far. And there has been an uptick in terrorism on American soil. In March alone there were four Islamist attacks in the United States. Even after the war ends, the increased anti-American rage produced by bombing children and killing the Ayatollah will make us all less safe.
The Trump team has yet to lay out any specific timelines or objectives for this war. We went into this without a plan and are now forced either to withdraw soon, having aggravated Iran, or engage in a prolonged war that potentially requires a land invasion. Both are terrible outcomes and failures of the administration to achieve its goals.
The administration has not articulated a clear path for achieving their objectives. The result is a strategic dilemma: either escalate toward a costly and uncertain ground conflict or withdraw having failed to achieve the stated goals, leaving a more hostile Iran than before.
Conclusion
This war is unjustifiable. None of the alleged explanations for why we are at war are satisfactory. We do not wage war with anti-American states. Iran did not pose a serious nuclear threat. And their actions against us, our allies, and their own people are not best addressed through war.
The administration’s goals are unclear, internally contradictory, and likely unattainable. We appear to seek regime change, nuclear disarmament, regional stability, and increased security all at once. Yet pursuing any one of these objectives undermines the others. Efforts to destabilize the regime risk empowering more extreme factions, attempts to degrade nuclear capacity may strengthen Iran’s incentive to obtain a deterrent, and efforts to secure the region have thus far produced greater instability, including attacks on U.S. allies and disruptions to global shipping lanes.
Wars are sometimes necessary, but they require clear justification and a realistic plan. This conflict has neither. Without a coherent strategy, continued escalation will worsen the very problems it was meant to solve. I hope I am wrong.
Image Credit: The Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group in the Strait of Hormuz – Wikimedia Commons
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